1942 and Caucasus attack

[Mist]

As you say, just my two cents into discussions. I've made very rough estimations for supply needed by single panzer division which moves. No ammunition supply is taken into account but I expect it to be at least 1/4 of weight of my total.
Gallon is considered as 4.5 litter and density of fuel is taken as 0.8 kg/litter.
I've approximate numbers which were mentioned by Ed somewhere for fuel requirements and decided to distribute them as following:

Tanks need 9 gallong per day
Recons -- 7
Trucks -- 5


So, my ROUGH calculations.

panzer division
240 tanks
240*9*4.5=9720 litters per day


Artillery 50 guns
A-tank 50 guns
Flak 30 flaks
=> 130 trucks
130*5*4.5=2925 litters per day


Recons 50 recons
50*7*4.5=1575 litters per day


Infantry 11000 fighting men
=>440 trucks
440*5 =9900 litters per day


15000 men requiring food
15000 kg per day

total fuel 9720+2925+1575+9900=24120 litters
weight of needed fuel~24120*0.8~19000 kg

supplies needed for moving panzer division
19000+15000=34000 kg per day ~240 tons per week

Basing on this it is possible to conclude that panzer korps(~3Pz divisions) requires
720 tonns of supplies each week if it does not fight but moves ahead.
If fighting occures, then both ammunition and fuel requirements will increase to a certain degree. IMHO fighting panzer korps will need at least 1000 tons per week. Please, make comments.

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by Mist:
...
Basing on this it is possible to conclude that panzer korps(~3Pz divisions) requires
720 tonns of supplies each week if it does not fight but moves ahead.
If fighting occures, then both ammunition and fuel requirements will increase to a certain degree. IMHO fighting panzer korps will need at least 1000 tons per week. Please, make comments.

Very nice Mist! I'm sure we should apply a generous 25% increase to cover the repair and parts replacement needs as well as medical, hygene and personal supplies. We might be sending the korps off to certain destruction, so we can at least make sure they have toilet paper

[RickyB]

Okay, I have one fairly reliable source: Numbers, Predictions and War by Colonel Dupuy of the US Army. In it, it states that fighting a defensive action, in very light combat in Italy, the average German division required 120 tons per day of supply. This was in 1944, when the Germans had 170 tanks at the front, or for the above average, 10 tanks per division. Of this number, ammunition and fuel were just under 40 tons each. In heavy defensive combat, ammo usage climbed to 84 tons and fuel to just under 50 tons, and an average of 180 tons per day.

This is with very little movement, and mainly infantry forces. Taking this number to an offensive movement against light opposition using a Panzer division, I would use the ammo usage of light combat, but maybe 150 tons for fuel. This is based on a much larger number of tanks and recon vehicles using fuel, and that they are moving large distances each day, rather than making just tactical movements. Thus, the total would be about 225 tons per day, which I just noticed Mist came up with his own estimate, and it is in this ballpark, so I think we are pretty close here.

I have a couple of sources on Stalingrad that state the Ju 52 carried about 2-2.5 tons into the pocket. Its total empty to max weight was closer to 6 tons, but from this you must subtract fuel, flight crew, etc. Anyway, at Stalingrad in terrible weather and in short winter days, the Luftwaffe with a maximum effort, including the limited use of the He177s and some huge gliders, never managed to get more than 300 tons in one day into the pocket. The average was much less, like 100 tons or so before January, when it dropped to half that. The Germans at this time had 750 Ju 52s throughout Europe and North Africa.

However, taking a look at doing this in the summer, you could count on longer days allowing multiple flights, and less bad weather, along with the possibility of massing these planes before they are needed. Thus, I would say you could probably count on the Luftwaffe being able to supply 300-400 tons per day in a maximum effort for at least a couple of weeks, maybe a month, before the strain started to tell and reduce the available aircraft. This means one and half to two panzer divisions could probably carry out offensive movement against light opposition in this case. This support would be limited to about 300 miles or 500 kilometers from quality, high supply airfields before the tonnage quickly drops due to the range. This is one area that WIR is very weak as it assumes that aircraft can carry full loads even when flying from an HQ at fairly low supply.

[Mist]

Originally posted by JustAGame:


Very nice Mist! I'm sure we should apply a generous 25% increase to cover the repair and parts replacement needs as well as medical, hygene and personal supplies. We might be sending the korps off to certain destruction, so we can at least make sure they have toilet paper

Jokes aside JustA. 25% are for ammunition and additional fuel for combat moving&fighting. But I think you're right and we should apply one more 25% of total weight for toilet paper.

[Mist]

Originally posted by RickyB:
Taking this number to an offensive movement against light opposition using a Panzer division, I would use the ammo usage of light combat, but maybe 150 tons for fuel. This is based on a much larger number of tanks and recon vehicles using fuel, and that they are moving large distances each day, rather than making just tactical movements. Thus, the total would be about 225 tons per day, which I just noticed Mist came up with his own estimate, and it is in this ballpark, so I think we are pretty close here.

COOL

Thus, I would say you could probably count on the Luftwaffe being able to supply 300-400 tons per day in a maximum effort for at least a couple of weeks, maybe a month, before the strain started to tell and reduce the available aircraft. This means one and half to two panzer divisions could probably carry out offensive movement against light opposition in this case.

If they have good airfields to recieve supplies and if pilots always know where to find moving division.


This support would be limited to about 300 miles or 500 kilometers from quality, high supply airfields before the tonnage quickly drops due to the range. This is one area that WIR is very weak as it assumes that aircraft can carry full loads even when flying from an HQ at fairly low supply.
I think that static unit should recieve much more supplies than moving one. In game it could be determined if unit has entrenchment of 2 or more. For example total_tonnage*sqrt(entrenchment/6). So, entrenched units which are staying in one place for month or so are much better prepared to recieve airlifts.
Units with entrenchment 1 will recieve 41% of airlift, 2 - 58%, 3 -71%, 4 - 82%, 5 - 91% and 6+ - 100%. This will make airsupply more realistic IMHO because moving units should recieve less than static which positions and airfields are well known

[ July 22, 2001: Message edited by: Mist ]

[Svar]

It is time for me to inject my 2 cents worth here. Assuming that you could supply a Panzer Korp that was cut off from normal supply, moving or fighting long distances would cause huge attrition losses to the AFVs. AFVs or tanks were designed to fight on the move and were not designed to act as transport. As such they don't travel long distances without breaking down or wearing out the tread on the tracks. In a normal supply situation, rear echleon troops recover and repair these tanks. In the situation described here those tanks would have to be abandoned. So if people want to be able to advance in an out of supply situation without a clear line of supply back to a hex in supply, there needs to be an attrition situation similar to the Germans during the Winter of 41/42 blizzard turns. I don't know how the game could implement that because it just looks at the supply condition of a particular hex, it doesn't know if there is a line of frendly controlled hexes leading to a supplied hex. The simplest solution would be to limit the movement of any unit in 0 supply to 1 hex.

Svar

[Mist]

temporaly removed

[ July 22, 2001: Message edited by: Mist ]

[JustAGame]

AIR MOBILITY PLANNING FACTORS

As best as I can tell, these are the formulas used to plan US airlift operations.

Click here for formulas.

[ July 23, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by RickyB:
Okay, I ...

I have a couple of sources on Stalingrad that state the Ju 52 carried about 2-2.5 tons into the pocket. Its total empty to max weight was closer to 6 tons, but from this you must subtract fuel, flight crew, etc. Anyway, at Stalingrad in terrible weather and in short winter days, the Luftwaffe with a maximum effort, including the limited use of the He177s and some huge gliders, never managed to get more than 300 tons in one day into the pocket. The average was much less, like 100 tons or so before January, when it dropped to half that. The Germans at this time had 750 Ju 52s throughout Europe and North Africa.

However, ...

During that winter of 42-43, 490 JU-52s had flown to Stalingrad with supplies at one point or another. Of those, 266 were lost to enemy action and the winter.

Incidentally, the JU-52 carried a significant payload for airdrop. According to Mike DelPreet:

The JU 52 was be used as a troop transport (17 fully equipped troops), a supply carrier, a staff transport, a casualty evacuator, and as an Ad-Hoc bomber. When used in the supply role, a JU 52 3m could carry a large amount of supplies. One plane could load 1500kg, inside the plane, and up to 4 drop containers which could load a plethora of items. These containers could load 100 litres of fuel or 250kg of ammunitions. These ammunitions could be 500 rounds for a 2cm gun, 150 3.7mm PAK rounds, 20 7.5mm rounds, or 55 8mm mortars to name a few of the possibilities.

This reference to actual capability ties nicely to RickB's Stalingrad example in that 2500kg = 2.755 tons.

[ July 23, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by JustAGame:
From an objective standpoint, I don't know the answer to that. I can assume that it isn't possible, but that is with admitting little to no knowledge of mountain climbing, human endurance, the climate of the region and the specifics of climbing that particular mountain.

Anyone who has heard a climber talking about Mt. Everest's summit, or a similar mountain, knows this answer. Being objective is not necessary, since the answer is obvious, as in "the sky is blue".

The only analogy was clearly stated that if the Germans possessed something less than 400 Ju-52s and HE-111s, then they could have achieved the same results as the smaller payload American and British planes used for the Berlin airlift. I didn't attempt to state anything more than that.

The planes used in the Berlin Airlift were larger planes with a larger capacity but depended on a long runway, so saying the older planes could have done the same thing is as claim without much backing. Smaller planes would have hurt since that would necessitate more flights to move the same amount than what occurred, and there was only so much space available in the air corridors. For obvious reasons, they chose the biggest planes they had available.

My point and the reason the Berlin airlift is relevant to this discussion is that much of this discussion hinges on many people's feeling that it is "impossible" to do something and support their belief with the argument that it hadn't been done before. Additionally, the Berlin airlift provides a case study of tactical and strategic mobility capabilities.

Whatever case studies the Berlin Airlift supplies does not mean much to an earlier situation with smaller planes in a shooting war trying to supply MOVING forces behind enemy lines. You just ignored everything I said about the problem of trying to use the Berlin Airlift as relevent to the debate at hand.

I don't know why we keep arguing about this. We all agree with the earlier info posted that the Germans, and presumably everyone else at the time, couldn't airlift a medium or heavy tank, don't we? If so, then a panzer division behind enemy lines wouldn't be able to last very long if it is moving and fighting continuously anyway, especially if the enemy knows they can't get new tanks, and thus concentrate on creating vehicle losses in the enemy corps.

RickyB's try at an estimate is good, but I don't think its really what we need. He does not include the hundreds of other vehicles besides the tanks, like the trucks, utility vehicles, tankers, and artillery/AT haulers found in mechanized units. His numbers are derived from stationary infantry forces not engaged in heavy combat. We need the average tons-per-day of a panzer division and a motorized division moving and fighting at a "normal" level of conflict for an extended period of time, say six weeks.

[ July 23, 2001: Message edited by: Ed Cogburn ]

[Mist]

well ok. My last post was removed because it has some wrong calculations because I failed to estimate how much fuel is needed by each type of vehicle per day if division is moving/advancing in battle order. But I can give some data on which I've tried to base my calculations.

Fuel usage by some tanks
PzI 100 litters/100 km
Pz III 320 litters/100 km
Tiger II 500 litters/100 km

full strength panzer division has

324 tanks
Recons 10
Halftrucks 421
Trucks 1402
Cars 561
Motorcycles 1289
Men 11792

Fuel for recons and halftracks can be based on PzI usage. Trucks possibly use 1/3 of PzII usage.
I hope someone will succeed to do what I've failed and this discussion will be closed.

[SoleSurvivor]

Well it gets worse. Ever tried to airlift horse carriages? Anti-Mine equipment?

No, under no condition the Germans nor the Russians in 194x can support moving formations. Limiting factors are:

readiness of aircraft: Just having aircraft doesn't mean you can use them. Especially in Winter conditions special equipment is needed for example equipment to unfreeze motors. It's also generally not a good idea to repair a plane in -20 C if you have no Hangar. Full-loaded transport planes stuck in mud aren't a good thing to have too.

Readiness of airport: Length and and status of the starting / landing way. Equipment for removing broken machines from airfield. Number of personnel for unloading machines. stock of fast-fix materials to allow damaged planes to fly back. AA-capability and fighter screen along the support way & over the air field to distract enemy attacks. Security of airfield from bomber, tank, infantry and artillery raids. distance from unit to supply.

Well... moving formations have no airfield? too bad. Dropping supply bombs will *never* help a single armored battalion if it's threatened in any way.

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

Anyone who has heard a climber talking about Mt. Everest's summit, or a similar mountain, knows this answer. Being objective is not necessary, since the answer is obvious, as in "the sky is blue".

Well, I agree the answer is as obvious as "the sky is blue". If we are limited to only what we see for ourselves, we might believe the sky is actually blue. Objectivity has it's merits.

Whatever case studies the Berlin Airlift supplies does not mean much to an earlier situation with smaller planes in a shooting war trying to supply MOVING forces behind enemy lines. You just ignored everything I said about the problem of trying to use the Berlin Airlift as relevent to the debate at hand.

Your comment here was actually preceded with my statement of relevance.

My point and the reason the Berlin airlift is relevant to this discussion is that much of this discussion hinges on many people's feeling that it is "impossible" to do something and support their belief with the argument that it hadn't been done before. Additionally, the Berlin airlift provides a case study of tactical and strategic mobility capabilities.

That we disagree on it's relevance doesn't mean that I ignored your comments; I chose to not rely upon them as the finite conclusion.

Also, for the sake of accuracy, the Berlin aircraft were airlifting with capacities of 1.5 tons, 3.5 tons (generous for the Dakotas) and 10 tons. The JU-52 had a real payload capacity of 2.75 tons, the HE-111 had normal payload of 2.2 tons (not max) and the He 177 had a payload of 15 tons.

I don't know why we keep arguing about this.

Some of us are researching the matter because we are curious. The discussion was going no where with opinions versus opinions. With hard data, it becomes increasingly too difficult to argue opinions without a bias shining through.

We all agree with the earlier info posted that the Germans, and presumably everyone else at the time, couldn't airlift a medium or heavy tank, don't we?

Sure. But this dramatically raises the benchmark of what was needed to be proven. The arguements were related to what happens in the game and in the game there are no equipment reinforcements for the mobile unit. The arguements were that the way he was airlifting supplies to his advancing korps was not historically possible. That arguement was echoed as the reason it shouldn't be allowed and it was also argued that such a feat couldn't even be accomplished today.

Whether or not it is wise or that it had not been done is exclusive to whether or not it was historically possible.

RickyB's try at an estimate is good, but I don't think its really what we need. He does not include the hundreds of other vehicles besides the tanks, like the trucks, utility vehicles, tankers, and artillery/AT haulers found in mechanized units. His numbers are derived from stationary infantry forces not engaged in heavy combat. We need the average tons-per-day of a panzer division and a motorized division moving and fighting at a "normal" level of conflict for an extended period of time, say six weeks.

I was under the impression that the discussed korps was not getting tied up in drawn out battles. I might be wrong and haven't the desire to search his comments out to quote him, but didn't Lorenzo remark on the hopelessness of his operation if the isolated unit gets bogged down?

Is the 6 week figure to find an average for the game's 1 week turns?

Ed, in all honesty, I enjoy the learning process that enables us to draw conclusions based on facts. I'm sure that the others who are digging for relevant data also enjoy the quest. Since we can never field test whatever conclusions are reached, we will ultimately reach a conclusion that either says it was probably impossible or probably possible. In either event, we are trying to use objective data.

[ July 24, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Mist:
well ok. My last post was removed because it has some wrong calculations because I failed to estimate how much fuel is needed by each type of vehicle per day if division is moving/advancing in battle order. But I can give some data on which I've tried to base my calculations.

Fuel usage by some tanks
PzI 100 litters/100 km
Pz III 320 litters/100 km
Tiger II 500 litters/100 km

full strength panzer division has

324 tanks
Recons 10
Halftrucks 421
Trucks 1402
Cars 561
Motorcycles 1289
Men 11792

Fuel for recons and halftracks can be based on PzI usage. Trucks possibly use 1/3 of PzII usage.
I hope someone will succeed to do what I've failed and this discussion will be closed.

Where did you get the info on panzer divisions assets? From the net somewhere? Good work, Mist!

3,000 to 4,000 vehicles in a panzer division using fuel. This is what was missing from RickyB's calculation. Now we need to convert the liters/100km to tons per day, and we need a good source for how many tons per day besides fuel is used by a panzer division, on the move and in combat, in a day.

[ July 24, 2001: Message edited by: Ed Cogburn ]

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by JustAGame:

Ed, in all honesty, I enjoy the learning process that enables us to draw conclusions based on facts. I'm sure that the others who are digging for relevant data also enjoy the quest. Since we can never field test whatever conclusions are reached, we will ultimately reach a conclusion that either says it was probably impossible or probably possible. In either event, we are trying to use objective data.

Yes, objective data. The problem is the Berlin Airlift is not at all relevent to the problem at hand. Even if we agree the data is objective, it still isn't relevent to our issue.

[Don Shafer]

I'm not sure who's doing the arguing here. I still say that if a player wants to devote the resources to air supply a SL0 unit to make a drive for the oilfields, what's the problem? We keep getting back to replacing destroyed equipment which I am against. But if the unit is not engaged in combat and readiness can be kept up to prevent equipment losses, I still don't think it's a bug. Personally, I would question why the Soviet player would leave the Caucasus undefended or maybe even a better question would be, if the railline from Stalingrad is cut (which in reality it was), why would this cause units to the south to be out of supply? I would consider Baku to be a supply point since it could be supplied across the Caspian Sea or even overland from Iran since it was a major point for Lend-Lease supplies.

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:


I don't know why we keep arguing about this. We all agree with the earlier info posted that the Germans, and presumably everyone else at the time, couldn't airlift a medium or heavy tank, don't we? If so, then a panzer division behind enemy lines wouldn't be able to last very long if it is moving and fighting continuously anyway, especially if the enemy knows they can't get new tanks, and thus concentrate on creating vehicle losses in the enemy corps.

[Svar]

Originally posted by Don Shafer:
I'm not sure who's doing the arguing here. I still say that if a player wants to devote the resources to air supply a SL0 unit to make a drive for the oilfields, what's the problem? We keep getting back to replacing destroyed equipment which I am against. But if the unit is not engaged in combat and readiness can be kept up to prevent equipment losses, I still don't think it's a bug. Personally, I would question why the Soviet player would leave the Caucasus undefended or maybe even a better question would be, if the railline from Stalingrad is cut (which in reality it was), why would this cause units to the south to be out of supply? I would consider Baku to be a supply point since it could be supplied across the Caspian Sea or even overland from Iran since it was a major point for Lend-Lease supplies.

Don,

I'm pretty sure that Baku is a Soviet supply point.

Svar

[Josans]

Personally, I would question why the Soviet player would leave the Caucasus undefended or maybe even a better question would be, if the railline from Stalingrad is cut (which in reality it was), why would this cause units to the south to be out of supply? I would consider Baku to be a supply point since it could be supplied across the Caspian Sea or even overland from Iran since it was a major point for Lend-Lease supplies.
[/QB][/QUOTE]

If the rail-line Stalingrad-Baku is cut dont leave the Caucasus out of supply. Baku is a supply source with level 5.

I dont want to make more fire about the airlifts but we are speaking about a panzer korps and also is the question if an infantry korps can fight behind enemy lines.
For anyway interested here are the datas for an infantry division prior to 1943 :

- HQ (administrative,police,medical...etc) : 253 motor vehicles; 245 horse-drawn vehicles.
- Reconnaissance Batalion :30 M; 3 H.
- Signal Battalion :103 M; 7 H.
- Artillery Regiment : 105 M; 229 H.
- Anti-Tank Battalion : 114 M; 0 H.
- Engineer Battalion : 87 M; 19 H.
- Three infantry regiments (3250 men each,and each with 683 horses, 6 small infantry guns, 2 large inf guns, 12 AT guns): 73 M (x3); 210 H (x3).

Total: 17000 men, 911 motor vehicles, 1133 horse-drawn vehicles and 5375 horses.

A division of this size needs daily : 53 tons of hay, 54 of food, 20 of fuel, 1 of lubricants, 10 of ordnance stores and 12 tons of other stores,excluding baggage and ammunition.

Josan.

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:



Yes, objective data. The problem is the Berlin Airlift is not at all relevent to the problem at hand. Even if we agree the data is objective, it still isn't relevent to our issue.

I'm not sure how an example of something being accomplished that had never been before and was largely thought to have been impossible doesn't relate to this discussion. Considering it has been a repeated arguement that Lorenzo's tactic couldn't have been done because noone ever did it and the best arguements against Lorenzo's tactic have been based on nothing more than the feeling than it is impossible.

If I didn't make that clear enough the other five ways I have said it, then I apologize for not communicating clearly.

[JustAGame]

Using actually equipment specifications and taking the significantly lower fuel economy range of travelling 100% cross country, I have compiled the numbers for how many litres of fuel per mile and, for the purpose of WIR, litres used per week in advancing two hexes (I think we somehow missed it that this force is only advancing 40 miles in a week's time). The purpose here is to help determine the fuel needs per week.

Offroad L/Mile Offroad 2-Hex
Fuel Economy Litres/Week
PzKpfw-IIf 2.16 86.44
R-35 2.68 107.28
Pz-38(t) 2.01 80.46
Pz-38(t)e 2.01 80.46
PzKpfw-IIIe 4.90 196.18
PzKpfw-IIIg 4.90 196.18
PzKpfw-IIIh 4.90 196.18
PzKpfw-IIIj 4.90 196.18
PzKpfw-IIIm 5.42 216.83
PzKpfw-IVd 5.82 232.73
PzKpfw-IVe 5.82 232.73
PzKpfw-IVg 5.82 232.73
PzKpfw-IVh 5.82 232.73
PzKpfw-IVj 5.82 232.73
Panther 6.71 268.52
M-13/40 Can't find
M-15/42 Can't find
Tiger 12.28 491.06
Konigstiger 16.74 669.46
Stug-IIIb 3.43 137.32
Stug-IIIg 3.22 128.74
Elefant 16.99 679.47
PzJg-1b 2.04 81.72
Marder II 2.30 91.96
Marder III 2.51 100.23
Nashorn 5.82 232.73
Hetzer 3.96 158.45
Jpz-IV 5.82 232.73
Jagdpanther 8.05 321.85
Jagdtiger 11.50 460.17

Motorcycle 0.14 5.72
Truck 0.57 22.95
Halftrack 0.80 32.19
Recon 0.32 12.87
Car 0.24 9.66

Taking Mist's full strength panzer division
full strength panzer division and extrapolating the numbers:

Litres Per Week
324 tanks Will break this down
Recons 10 129
Halftrucks 421 13,550
Trucks 1402 32,175
Cars 561 5,417
Motorcycles 1289 7,376
Men 11792

Now, using the 7th Panzer Div tank numbers on June 22, 1941 (this division started the war with significantly more tanks than other divisions):

# Litres Per Week
PzKpfw-IIf 55 4,755
Pz-38(t)e 170 13,679
PzKpfw-IVd 30 6,982

Add these weekly usage numbers = 84,062 L/wk

Using
1. Rick's high end ammo usage of 84 tons/day
2. Josan's hay usage of 53 tons/day
3. Josan's assorted usage 22 tons/day
4. x5 Josan's lubricant usage 5 tons/day
5. Josan's food usage for 17k men 54 tons/day
6. Another 100 tons/day for parts, replacement engines, etc.

Now we have a supply need of
1. 2,216 tons per week plus
2. 84,062 litres of fuel per week

This supply need is under the assumption that the movement is through the worse possible terrain and nothing is foraged from the remains of shattered speedbumps. Additionally, it assumes continuous heavy combat every day of the week. Using a less pessimistic approach would result in about 30-40% less need.

Still working on a model to compute the airlift requirements to accomplish this operation. The model is based on that used by military planners for US operations.