Brave Sir Robin

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Feinder

The more (longer) that I play WitP, the more that I consider the WitP engine (and especially so the land combat engine) a steaming pile of poo.

IMO, the OBs of the units, and the capabilities of the units themselves, bear little resemblence to their actual historical counter-parts. I do NOT consider the full-scale invasion of Australia or the whole-sale conquest of India a "historical what-if". I -do- cosider it entertaining fantasy. But no, I do not by any attempt at justification, cosider it "a historical what-if". While I am quite sure many would say I was myopic biggot for claiming that, well - I've been called worse.

Given that in WitP a massive invasion of India or Oz seem to be the norm, WitP is therefor categorized as "entertaining fantasy". It -IS- a very enjoyable game. But it is a very POOR simulation. It's an excellent, very complicated and detailed *fantasy*, but as far as simulation is concerned; well, it's not.

Yes, I agree. But gosh, we got what we got. It’s kinda like being ‘outside’ and looking for a ‘set’. You ride what you get, and if you are lucky, it’s high, tubular and long; if not, you get 2 or 3 quick turns and then kick out. Maybe not a steaming pile of poo, but perhaps dry dreck droppings.

The real bit$h in the older games is the Japanese ability to mount humongous invasions of here & there & everywhere, because of the lack of stress on their shipping resources. Unfortunate, but “life stinks”. I think (hope) we fixed this in AE. You might see an "entertaining fantasy" in an AE game, but if you do it will be because I didn’t do my job correctly, or somebody is too stupid to read the new manual.

Trust us. John

[Andvari]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: JWE

Moved elsewhere to avoid hijack.

Darn John!!! Its been awhile since the forum has seen a bonafide Donnybrook the likes of the Zero v Wildcat debates...

Just go up to the top. Bonnybrook was a small stream compared to this one. Erin go bragh! Perdition to the oppressor!

Peace, love, and happiness through superior armament. Ciao.

John

Gotta go up & over, cause "As much as I wish the death of the false Prince, I must not herald the point. He is as a bag of wind, and cutting him opens the air, as a pipe buvets." Extra credit for who and when.

Falstaff...Henry IV?

[moses]

The reason Sir Robin is even an issue is because ground combat is so poorly modeled in the game.

In reality without proper preparation, any invasion is almost certain to be a disaster. The idea that you can just send a force unsupported into enemy airspace, land on the beach and capture the defenders in just a day or two is just a fantasy.

The early Japanese conquests were successful because they were well suported and followed standerd doctrines of the time. As a result the allied forces hardly stood a chance.

Typical WITP japanese offensives would have met with almost certain catastrophy even against outguned and outnumbered allied forces.

Faced with ridiculous and historically impossible japanese invasion scheduales, allied players are perfectly justified in simply bugging out.

[Nikademus]

In my experiences, "Sir Robin" has more to do with player mindset than any flaw in the game itself. Its tough to play Japan, knowing that your resources are very finite while those of the opponent are renewable, yet during your "happy period" the opponent (in extreme cases.....aka a true "Sir Robin" type game) your opponent litterally hides all his vital assets waiting for 1943 to come around then comes out of PH or West coast to take the war to you. Its also extremely boring in a game that requires so much of a time commitment.

The best games are with those willing to engage with strategies that are both historically viable but variable at the same time. The "Hindsight" game works equally for both sides after all.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: moses

The reason Sir Robin is even an issue is because ground combat is so poorly modeled in the game.

In reality without proper preparation, any invasion is almost certain to be a disaster. The idea that you can just send a force unsupported into enemy airspace, land on the beach and capture the defenders in just a day or two is just a fantasy.

The early Japanese conquests were successful because they were well suported and followed standerd doctrines of the time. As a result the allied forces hardly stood a chance.

Typical WITP japanese offensives would have met with almost certain catastrophy even against outguned and outnumbered allied forces.

Faced with ridiculous and historically impossible japanese invasion scheduales, allied players are perfectly justified in simply bugging out.

Speaking of this issue, would someone care to explain why river crossings and assault landings create shock attacks even when there's a bridge or beach-head? Why was that necessary?

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: herwin


Speaking of this issue, would someone care to explain why river crossings and assault landings create shock attacks even when there's a bridge or beach-head? Why was that necessary?

The current WitP design was IIRC a result of the tactic of sending in a small force to trigger the first turn shock attack then following up the next day with the house and the kitchen sink before the defender could respond.

IIRC AE has modified this routine to the effect: if the bridgehead has AV = % of the defending AV then a shock attack will not be initiated by the follow-up forces. In addition IIRC this will only apply to River Crossings and not Atoll landings. You may not be happy with this compromise, but it certainly is better than what currently exists.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: herwin


Speaking of this issue, would someone care to explain why river crossings and assault landings create shock attacks even when there's a bridge or beach-head? Why was that necessary?

The current WitP design was IIRC a result of the tactic of sending in a small force to trigger the first turn shock attack then following up the next day with the house and the kitchen sink before the defender could respond.

IIRC AE has modified this routine to the effect: if the bridgehead has AV = % of the defending AV then a shock attack will not be initiated by the follow-up forces. In addition IIRC this will only apply to River Crossings and not Atoll landings. You may not be happy with this compromise, but it certainly is better than what currently exists.

OK, I see. In reality, the defence would have an opportunity to counterattack before the follow-up forces enter the bridgehead. There are three typical outcomes: it works (wipe out the bridgehead or beachhead), it stalls the bridgehead, but doesn't wipe it out--there's little room for follow-up forces--or it fails and the follow-up forces can attack through the bridgehead. (Treat the stalled case as a repulse, no bridgehead.) It's very similar to what happens in a frontal attack on a fortified line. The key to an effective defence is for local reserves to intervene before the assaulting forces can organise the position they've captured. For that to be effective, someone on the scene has to act. In game terms, roll the dice for initiative. If the roll is passed, the remaining defensive forces get a free counterattack against a disorganised attacker before the turn is over. The German Army was good at this in both world wars, mostly because they made sure someone on the scene (either a regimental commander or one of his three battalion commanders) could be expected to show the initiative to do something appropriate. If the bridgehead survives, the defence should be able to prepare follow-on attacks taking advantage of the attacking force's lack of organised defences.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: herwin


Speaking of this issue, would someone care to explain why river crossings and assault landings create shock attacks even when there's a bridge or beach-head? Why was that necessary?

The current WitP design was IIRC a result of the tactic of sending in a small force to trigger the first turn shock attack then following up the next day with the house and the kitchen sink before the defender could respond.

IIRC AE has modified this routine to the effect: if the bridgehead has AV = % of the defending AV then a shock attack will not be initiated by the follow-up forces. In addition IIRC this will only apply to River Crossings and not Atoll landings. You may not be happy with this compromise, but it certainly is better than what currently exists.

OK, I see. In reality, the defence would have an opportunity to counterattack before the follow-up forces enter the bridgehead. There are three typical outcomes: it works (wipe out the bridgehead or beachhead), it stalls the bridgehead, but doesn't wipe it out--there's little room for follow-up forces--or it fails and the follow-up forces can attack through the bridgehead. (Treat the stalled case as a repulse, no bridgehead.) It's very similar to what happens in a frontal attack on a fortified line. The key to an effective defence is for local reserves to intervene before the assaulting forces can organise the position they've captured. For that to be effective, someone on the scene has to act. In game terms, roll the dice for initiative. If the roll is passed, the remaining defensive forces get a free counterattack against a disorganised attacker before the turn is over. The German Army was good at this in both world wars, mostly because they made sure someone on the scene (either a regimental commander or one of his three battalion commanders) could be expected to show the initiative to do something appropriate. If the bridgehead survives, the defence should be able to prepare follow-on attacks taking advantage of the attacking force's lack of organised defences.

I understand what your suggesting but it was and is outside the scope of AE code changes. Hopefully the code in AE will be a satisfactory compromise.

[mdiehl]

Faced with ridiculous and historically impossible japanese invasion scheduales, allied players are perfectly justified in simply bugging out.

Exactly. Japanese early war capacity is radically overestimated, and the air to air combat routine so utterly flawed in favor of the Japanese that the entire strategic picture painted by WitP is radically different from the one that existed in the real world, and delivers to the Japanese player the ability to entertain objectives and employ strategies that were never available to the real Japanese. This allows them to exploit hindsight in ways that the Allied player cannot.

[ChezDaJez]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Faced with ridiculous and historically impossible japanese invasion scheduales, allied players are perfectly justified in simply bugging out.

Exactly. Japanese early war capacity is radically overestimated, and the air to air combat routine so utterly flawed in favor of the Japanese that the entire strategic picture painted by WitP is radically different from the one that existed in the real world, and delivers to the Japanese player the ability to entertain objectives and employ strategies that were never available to the real Japanese. This allows them to exploit hindsight in ways that the Allied player cannot.

Unfortunately, a full "Sir Robin" exacerbates and produces a Catch-22 situation. The more the Allied player runs, the easier becomes the Japanese player advance, the more the Allied player screams about Japanese capabilities resulting in more running, etc, etc, etc...

Obviously, it pays to careful select an opponent who wants the same type game you do. Throw in a house rule or two and the game can actually be quite enjoyable and stay within the realms of reality.

Chez

[mdiehl]

The more the Allied player runs, the easier becomes the Japanese player advance, the more the Allied player screams about Japanese capabilities resulting in more running, etc, etc, etc...

The basic problem is that the early war Japanese are far more powerful than historically. The complaint with "Sir Robin" is that Allies opt for it, rather than allowing the Japanese player to run up the score shooting fish in a barrel.

Allied players opt for it because leaving one's assets in place doesn't slow down the Japanese advance and doesn't prevent the Japanese from attemping objectives such as invading Ceylon, Johnston, Hawaii, New Caledonia, Australia, and India, that they never attempted to invade (probably because they COULDN'T have attempted to invade them).

Sir Robin allows the Allied player to extract assets and bide for time, hoping their morale, readiness, and material will have sufficient improvement to allow them to be used to defend those places that Japanese in the game regularly invade, even though the real Japanese could not have touched these places.

House rules won't help unless the house rules are that the Japanese cannot invade Australia, Hawaii, anywhere in continental North America, India, or Ceylon.

What *would* help is to put a very strong time bias in the early war, such that the longer the Allies hold out in their historical at-start positions, the more VPs the Allies get. And it should be exponential, such that for example having even a single brigade hold out on Bataan until May 1942 pays off more in VPs for the Allies than they lose in men and material casualty VPs accorded to the Japanese.

[DaveB]

I think this is a well reasoned and accurate assessment. This is a game, it provides (to an extent) the flavour of a period we all enjoy 'what if' wargaming, but there are too many problems with the program - fun though it is - to allow realistic modelling of the war theatre. If I want to sail 50 DD's around as an ASW TF that's my own stupidity at work - I might well kill a few subs near Pearl/Brisbane/wherever - but I'll be awful short of decent escorts for major troop convoys.... the 'other' player should be concentrating on maximising the opportunities I offer, not legislating that I am only to follow official doctrine from 1943.

I can see the point of SOME house rules, those that prevent obviously ahistorical situations from being exploited - other decisions, such as stripping the DEI outposts like Bali, to boost my 1942 bases in Darwin etc., should be seen as a choice I have made that offers the Jap player a wide swathe of map to conquer rapidly at low cost....not an opportunity to complain that in real life that wasn't likely to happen.

As for Dutch (for example) soldiers not agreeing to being shipped out while families remained behind- a great many Australians fought in the western desert while a very real threat to the Australian mainland was envisaged from the Japanese. I am unaware of any significant rebellion in the Aussie troops at the time. British troops shipped out to Singapore while the blitz was ongoing in the UK. A whole raft of nationalities moved all over the place - what did the north African or Indian troops think, or the Chinese labourers, when they met the mud of France in WW1?

Troops, in the main, went where their commanders sent them in WW2, and to complain that shipping certain nationalities to X Y or Z does not reflect reality seems, to me, to be simply and very obviously contrary to what really happened 60 years or so ago. If you have enough house rules what's the point of playing a game predestined to follow historical results? I'm sure some enjoy it, but goodness knows why they bother.

Dave

[ChezDaJez]

The benefit of house rules is that both players are on the same page and their concerns of game abuse are addressed.

Some like one or two, others dozens. Brad and I have probably 2 dozen house rules. In retrospect, we didn't need them because neither one of us tries to stretch the limits of the game. The house rules are there because neither one of us knew the other's style of play very well in the beginning. They were discussed and incorporated to prevent misunderstandings. Both of us have also addressed occurances in the game. It's not uncommon for one of us to say, "Oops, I think I violated HR #9." We talk about it and in every case, we have been able to change the rule or determine that it wasn't in violation.

In regards to "Sir Robin":

In the first 6 months of the war, Brad used both an active defense and passive defense to slow me down. And he scored several success doing so. He made a magnificent stand at Mandalay which remains in allied hands. He stopped me at Wuchow. He greatly impeded the conquering of the Philippines and Singapore. And he inflicted a lot of damage on my ships with his continuous airstrikes... especially by those Brit and Dutch air forces. He did not execute a full scale "Sir Robin" though I am sure he did save some land units through evacuation by sub, hook, or crook. [;)] What he did do was a fighting retreat. Did he suffer losses... he most certainly did but I'm willing to bet his losses weren't that much more than would happen during a full-scale "Sir Robin" and he inflicted damage in return.

His bombers have continued to be a thorn in my side by closing airfields and interdicting supply convoys headed for the front. His subs have been active and while not exactly hugely effective due to the torps (Apr 43), he has had some successes with them and forced me to cover my supply convoys. He managed to sink the CA Maya with a sub on 10 Dec. And just last turn, he nearly put torps into one of my BBs.

Sir Robin allows the Allied player to extract assets and bide for time, hoping their morale, readiness, and material will have sufficient improvement to allow them to be used to defend those places that Japanese in the game regularly invade, even though the real Japanese could not have touched these places.

mdiehl, I understand your point and don't necessarily disagree with it in general. However, I do believe that if players were more selective in comparing their style of play to a prospective opponent, many of these issues would be avoided.

What *would* help is to put a very strong time bias in the early war, such that the longer the Allies hold out in their historical at-start positions, the more VPs the Allies get. And it should be exponential, such that for example having even a single brigade hold out on Bataan until May 1942 pays off more in VPs for the Allies than they lose in men and material casualty VPs accorded to the Japanese.

Not a bad idea... though I personally don't play for victory points.

TO AFBs everywhere:

As I have never played as the allies in a PBEM, just how immediately useful are those cadres that allied players often extract. Do they really provide substantial improvement to say the defense of Australia in 1942? 1943? Just curious.

Chez

[bradfordkay]

Chez, to give an idea - I managed to pull about ten sub loads of a Philippine Army Divison out of Cebu before it fell. Now (April '43) it is about half strength sitting in relative security (I ain't saying where!). US and British troops would likely rebuild faster, but dutch ones about the same (and if it's multiple dutch units it will take longer).

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Chez, to give an idea - I managed to pull about ten sub loads of a Philippine Army Divison out of Cebu before it fell. Now (April '43) it is about half strength sitting in relative security (I ain't saying where!). US and British troops would likely rebuild faster, but dutch ones about the same (and if it's multiple dutch units it will take longer).

Ten Sub loads!

Hey wasn't that 10 support squads!
[:D]

Well I don't think this will be possible in AE ... [:)]

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Chez, to give an idea - I managed to pull about ten sub loads of a Philippine Army Divison out of Cebu before it fell. Now (April '43) it is about half strength sitting in relative security (I ain't saying where!). US and British troops would likely rebuild faster, but dutch ones about the same (and if it's multiple dutch units it will take longer).

Ten Sub loads!

Hey wasn't that 10 support squads!
[:D]

Well I don't think this will be possible in AE ... [:)]

Depending on the subs involved, it COULD be up to 30 support squads... more likely 20 (most US fleet subs in stock have 48 cap, some have 60 depending on the model and the year.) Of course, it might have hauled out some other types of squads.

Of course S-boats have less than 20...

AFAIK (at least in stock and CHS) - all support squads are in the same pool, so it is possible to "flesh out" cadre units quite quickly no matter what nationality... i suppose in reality, the unit would actually be part Philippino, and part US troops... in my mind, i picture the support troops being Philippine immigrants in the US Army being assigned to Philippine units in a support role...[:D]

[bradfordkay]

Yes, those were the larger US fleet boats (but exactly which ones with what capacity I don't recall). Unlike others, I don't dedicate my US subs to transport/mining duty in '42 - but when I have cutoff troops needing rescue I will use the US fleet boats in preference to any others.

And, yes, there were some other types of squads collected, but again I do not recall what the mix was.

[Roger Neilson II]

This has really produced a lot of interest looking at the number of hits and the number of postings. My take on the whole issue, for what it is worth.

I play Allied always. I enjoy the early months of the full campaign most of the whole thing I think. I enjoy it because it provides a real set of challenges. In the later game I'm in a situation where I have s much stuff to order and so many opportunities I can be, and am, fairly wasteful of what I have. Some pretty useful stuff is probably languishing in some backwater because I have so much to move I get tired and just hit the 'end move' save button.

Now at the start that is emphatically not the situation. Every plane can make a difference, every ship can potentially throw a spanner in the works of the enemy plans. Every move I make I carefully consider the timing of a withdrawal, the relative merits of sitting for another move. Most of my current experience is in CHS and I know how vital air support personnel are for Oz and India. I am not going to leave them to consume supplies and contribute nothing to a defence of somewhere that is going to get taken with no actual effort by my opponent.

Most places are impossible to defend, and with the death ray betty uberweapon impossible to supply or reinforce. I don't consider I have a choice therefore about Sir Robin or not, leave the guys where they are and they will not be there for long. Now if I do that I also lose the unit - so I can't have a rebuild later in the war. This does not make any sense.

So the key problems of the game, to me are:
1. Unit designations die with the troops
2. Vast ranged effective Japanese torpedo use

To counter these the best I have come up with is to pull cadres out where possible, and to stage fighters where I can to chop down unsupported jap bombers.

I play knowing that whilst it is not inevitable that Singapore and the DEI will fall, I can see the signs as the game develops far in advance of the actual troop commanders in real life and act upon this. In the same way my opponent knows a lot more about what he can get away with and acts in that manner. Its a game. Its a really good game.

PPs are a major limiting factor, budgeting for their use is a big part of the opening months. I don't have a Brave Sir Robin timetable from move one, but I do husband my resources and every little success maintains my morale in those pretty morale sapping opening months. If my opponent understands my strategy he can counter and exploit it. So, to signal a complete Brave Sir Robin is silly, to signal a stand and die strategy is also silly. To keep him guessing is, to my mind, the best way to play and also the best way to make the game enjoyable in terms of a challenge for both sides. In a current game what must have been looking like a pretty definite BSR has just seen some nasty counter moves that may just have given an opponent a pause for reflection.

Keeping the initiative is a crucial part of winning, you surender the initiaitve when you become reactive, passive or predictable.

OTOH I have yet to see many postings by Allied players who actually outline how you can do well and not use Brave Sir Robin to a lesser or greater degree.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Faced with ridiculous and historically impossible japanese invasion scheduales, allied players are perfectly justified in simply bugging out.

Exactly. Japanese early war capacity is radically overestimated, and the air to air combat routine so utterly flawed in favor of the Japanese that the entire strategic picture painted by WitP is radically different from the one that existed in the real world, and delivers to the Japanese player the ability to entertain objectives and employ strategies that were never available to the real Japanese. This allows them to exploit hindsight in ways that the Allied player cannot.

According to Richard Berg, Operation "IAI was one of the key historical examples of economy of force. The Japanese gained the majority of their objectives within one month of Pearl Harbor. EOTS allows you to see the broad outlines of this conquest and much of the initial order of battle is designed to give some insight into the complexity of this multi-dimensional plan. Due to the small-scale nature of some of these operations that are below the granularity of EOTS, although all key features are accounted for, some of the smaller detachments are subsumed into the broader tapestry of the game design. It is important to note that the card indicates that there are no Allied ZOI during this Offensive. The order of the Japanese moves would be different if this had to be taken into account."

Note that this suggests:
1. Japanese historical performance was damn near optimal.
2. Japanese historical performance took advantage of a lack of allied air assets.
3. The plan was a strategic surprise.

In EOTS, the standard game begins on the first turn of 1942, making the assumption that Allied leadership took that long to get their initial act together.

[Jim D Burns]

[

ORIGINAL: treespider
IIRC AE has modified this routine to the effect: if the bridgehead has AV = % of the defending AV then a shock attack will not be initiated by the follow-up forces.

This totally flies in the face of all military logic. Establishing a bridgehead against well fortified troops behind a river was one of the hardest military operations to pull off in WWII and required more forces not less.

But with this crazy rule you send a small detachment into the hex and it suffers the shattering affects of the crossing. This then automatically assumes this tiny fraction of the force achieves a bridgehead for some bizarre reason and the next day your huge army crosses the river unmolested.

Who on earth thought up this stupid rule? It has no basis in reality and is the opposite of historical river crossings.

Now *if* the tiny advancing force was automatically retreated if it lost the battle, then the rule would be fine. But if I read the rule right, it is guaranteed to create a bridgehead no matter what.

Ridiculous!

River crossings were a bitch and a half, this rule makes them easy as pie and not very costly to an attacker either.

Jim