A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Bo Rearguard]

I was reading on Combined Fleet that three days prior to the Pearl attack on December 4th, weather conditions in the North Pacific were so bad that rough seas cause the Carrier Striking Force's destroyers to roll up to 45 degrees. Refueling scheduled for that day had to be cancelled.

Bad enough conditions for seasoned sailors. I could only imagine what it would have been like for infantrymen on those proposed destroyer transports. I bet the mops would have busy.

[warspite1]

I was reading on Combined Fleet that three days prior to the Pearl attack on December 4th, weather conditions in the North Pacific were so bad that rough seas cause the Carrier Striking Force's destroyers to roll up to 45 degrees. Refueling scheduled for that day had to be cancelled.

Bad enough conditions for seasoned sailors. I could only imagine what it would have been like for infantrymen on those proposed destroyer transports. I bet the mops would have busy.

warspite1

Yes I raised this point and referenced the Germans heading for Narvik and Trondheim..... and that was only a few days at sea. There is also the very real problem of lack of exercise, keeping up fitness levels, diet etc. on the cramped, basic destroyer conversions in even moderately bad conditions..... This was a major problem exacerbated by the fact that the troops could have been at sea for months under the proposed plan.

But the answer was simply that such concerns can be disregarded. Reason?

It’s the Code of Bushido, and man’s a kamikaze, innit?

[Aurelian]

I was reading on Combined Fleet that three days prior to the Pearl attack on December 4th, weather conditions in the North Pacific were so bad that rough seas cause the Carrier Striking Force's destroyers to roll up to 45 degrees. Refueling scheduled for that day had to be cancelled.

Bad enough conditions for seasoned sailors. I could only imagine what it would have been like for infantrymen on those proposed destroyer transports. I bet the mops would have busy.

But what if Japan could control the weather? They have everything else under control in the various versions of the plan, so why not that too?

[Curtis Lemay]

It would have been worse than that for the Japanese as in this scenario both the USN CVs aircraft would be operating from ashore as SOP and most if not all based at Luke Field on Ford Island, an airbase that the Japanese did minimal damage to on Dec 7th, mainly due to its huge size as well as the concentrated defensive AA available in the area. The two CVs combined would have had about 36 fighters ashore and after that it would come down to how many the Japanese could put out of immediate action. Same for the 100+ SBDs/TBDs that would also have been ashore in this scenario.

Can't train carrier pilots unless they're on carriers.

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

When the US carriers were in port their aircraft would transfer to an airfield (almost always Luke Field) in order to continue their training. The airfield would even have markers representing deck take-off points. Have you read anything like Lundstrom's "First Team" series?

My understanding was that of the 72 planes on Enterprise, only 24 were flown to Pearl on December 7, 1941. 11 were shot down. That leaves 48 on board.

Nevertheless, this site (Quora) answers a couple of questions about US carriers being in port or running into the Jap fleet:

https://www.quora.com/If-3-US-aircraft- ... ese-attack

Quora

If 3 US aircraft carriers were at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, could they have fought off the Japanese attack?

Henry Sirotin
Adjunct Professor Author has 218 answers and 60.4K answer views

“No. The Japanese would have had superiority in numbers, better fighters and torpedo bombers, and highly proficient aircrew (their standards were higher than ours) with several years of combat experience in China. They were prepared for war- at this point, we weren’t. We simply didn’t have the mindset yet. It took Pearl Harbor and several months of real war training to produce that.”

Tim Mahoney
Former USAF Industrial Security Program Manager (1989–1993) Author has 1.6K answers and 587.3K answer views

“If you're thinking that the Navy aircraft from those carriers would have made a difference in the outcome of the Pearl Harbor attack, you're grasping at straws and ignoring the hard military realities of that moment in history. First, if the Navy aircraft were safely on land bases, it's highly likely that they would have been caught on the ground and destroyed the way the Army aircraft had been. If you want to pretend that some Navy fighters might have gotten airborne and been difference makers, feel free…but you're mistaken. The principal US fighters that MIGHT have been available at Pearl Harbor were the Army P-40 and the Navy F4F Wildcat. Both visibly inferior to the Zero and would have had grossly inexperienced U S pilots confronting veteran, combat trained Japanese pilots, even if they had been airborne in anything close to large numbers…which they weren't.

The air groups would be at ford island, hit by 54 dive bombers then strafed by fighters during the first wave; then by 20 or so level bombers then strafed by fighters during the second wave. enterprise had F4F, Lex had F2A; don’t know when Saratoga replaced F2A with F4F, but had F4F on 7 Dec 41. They probably would have as much effect as those at wake, midway, i.e., not much.

You also have to remember that this was a Sunday and it was a surprise attack. Even though the planes are fueled, they do not have ordnance. You do not park the planes at the airfields loaded with weapons. ---That is just too dangerous.

All the ordnance is over in the Weapons Department magazines. So, while the airfield is being bombed, are you suggesting they should have driven over there and grabbed a bunch of ammo? The airstrike was all-but over in only a short time. It did not take the Japanese very long to fly over and expend their bombs. And, after you expend your ordnance, you do not hang around to have a look; people are going to be shooting at you. In spite of what you see in the movies, the whole show lasted less than 15 minutes, and they were headed back to the carriers. It takes MUCH longer than that to round up a crew on a Sunday morning, drive out to the mag area and get the available weapons, drive back, and prep the planes. And don't forget, the whole island is now in pure chaos. The whole harbor is in flames, and someone is begging for the keys to the weapons magazines out at the airfield. imagine you are the person in charge of guarding those magazines and a herd of half-nuts people wanted to get in. Do you give them the keys, or shoot them? Remember, this was NOT a 'normal' day at all.”

Related
If the American aircraft carriers had been able to attack the Japanese battlegroup off Pearl Harbor, how much would it have shortened the war?

John Collins
PhD in Chemistry, Princeton University Author has 5.8K answers and 9.3M answer views

“It is unlikely that the US carriers would have prevailed. IJN crews were experienced after battles against the Chinese in Southeast Asia. No USN aircraft could outfight a Zero. Japanese torpedoes worked reliably and at long range. USN naval tactics were evolving. Even months later at Guadalcanal, US carriers operated too far apart to give mutual assistance. In all likelihood, both US carriers available near Pearl Harbor would have been lost. If they got lucky, they might have taken out one or two IJN carriers but were outnumbered, out-trained, out-experienced and fighting with inferior weapons and tactics. The fortunes of war do not always play out as expected, but IJN is likely to have delivered a powerful blow to USN forces.”

I especially like the notion that “the whole island was in pure chaos”. Doesn’t sound like they’re going to be making the right moves for a while – as I’ve been saying.

Their planes are going to be caught on the ground without ammo and decimated. Any that get airborne will be inferior both in planes and pilots. Note that the Lexington had F2As – not even F4Fs yet. Probably even what F4Fs were available were still unfamiliar to their pilots.

This meshes well with my long contention that the US was clueless and unprepared for war. The whole theme of this is a scathing view of US readiness.

[Curtis Lemay]

And if two battalions of Japanese troops had just landed on Maui when the mission abort was sounded then they can simply "remain in hiding" for 24 hours on a populated US island territory until the APDs return to pick them up and carry them off to safety.

warspite1

I wondered what you meant by that and then I re-read Curtis Lemay’s response to KingHart. To be clear, it is being proposed that 2,000 men, landed on Maui in the evening of 6 December 1941, could remain in hiding there (if the raid had to be cancelled) and then picked up in secret in the evening of the 7 December 1941. No one at any point detects 12 destroyer sized vessels sailing around Maui at will. No one spots 2,000 enemy troops and their equipment just inland from a beach for 24 hours....

Maui is 727 square miles in area. Lots of Jungle.

[Curtis Lemay]

Again no starting details. Just admit you can't show how your plan could work in real life and we can stop asking these trivial questions.

Again, it's too trivial to waste time on details only the Japanese would need to figure out. They can figure out the optimum time to top off and stop to wait for the APDs to get far enough ahead.

Are you serious? Or have you just not read up on the actual process used by the Japanese in the lead up to the historic raid?

The historical plan didn't have an abort option. Radios and code words are all that are needed.

[Curtis Lemay]

I wrote:

Japan had a major problem with training sufficient carrier based aircrew to meet war losses once the war started. Losing these carrier based fighters from one of the main Japanese carriers, may potentially have put that carrier out of action for a while, no? Unless they denuded the second line carriers further.

In response to this, Curtis Lemay said this was a problem for later down the road and wouldn’t stop the Maui operation. He also said in answer to another post, that instead of one carrier’s fighters being used on Maui, it would need two.

So this is now two front line carriers of the 1st Air Fleet without fighters on 8 December 1941, and no timescale for when they can be brought back up to strength. Remember the KB has to assist with the new Midway operation, the failed Wake operation and then all the things it did between December and June - and two carriers have no fighters....

The Jap carriers had 135 Zeros. They lost 9 in the raid. If they leave 32 they still have 94 left for Midway.

Curtis Lemay also said two more things.

One was that land based naval pilots could have been carrier trained. Again this assumes massive amounts of foresight, but also takes no account of why the Japanese carrier pilot training program was as limited in numbers as it was. How easy was it for the IJNAF to decide that all pilots must be carrier trained and then have the resources to try and put in place such a program? Surely all that is going to do is limit the number of land based pilots as the bottleneck in training starts to tell.

He also said the pilots on Maui could be swapped with land based pilots. This is a pretty big assumption. I am not seeing a lot of exposed and vulnerable Zeros, starved of fuel and ammunition (not to mention AA defence) surviving on Maui (assuming they ever got there in the first place) for long, and as for the Bettys.....

Initial delivery of 5000 tons of supplies means they are not starved of fuel. And they are hardly vulnerable to whatever flotsam and jetsam survives on Pearl.

The Zeros on Maui can be swapped with the Luzon Zeros via Midway once it's in Jap hands.

[Curtis Lemay]

...the plan...

Curtis Lemay is violating both SPI's War in the Pacific and VG Pacific War war game rules!

From SPI's WitP:

COMBAT MISSIONS
[10.1] AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
(AMPH: Engagement Value: 1)
APB (or MS) units assigned to load (embark) Friendly cargo and transport and unload (disembark) it in a hex not controlled by the Friendly Player are performing an Amphibious Assault.

Procedure
Because amphibious operations require an extraordinary amount of advance planning, AMPH Missions may be Plotted only under certain circumstances.

Both an APB unit and the cargo that are to participate in an amphibious assault must spend a certain amount of time in preparation.

Before an APB unit may be assigned to an AMPH Mission the unit must spend an amount of time in preparation, based on the number of Load Points to be disembarked in the hex in a single Game-Turn. The amount of time required varies as follows (Cycle in which planning began):

ALLIES
Cycle 13/41 to 13/43 | 1 Game-Turn per Load Point
Cycle l/44+ | 1 Game-Turn per three Load Points (round fractions up)

JAPANESE
(All Cycles)
1 or 2 Load Points to be disembarked in a given Game-Turn | 1 Game-Turn per Load Point
More than 2 Load Points to be Load disembarked in a given Game-Turn | 2 Game-Turns per Point



Plotting
On a separate index card (one each for each AMPH Mission), the Player should record:
A. The specific cargo that will be disembarked (i.e., its current hex location);
B. the specific APB units involved;
C. the hex the cargo will be disembarked in (i.e. the hex that will be amphibiously assaulted);
D. the Game-Turn in which the units will become available for the AMPH Mission.

Example of an Allied AMPH Mission Plot against the island of Kwajalein:

"APB l, carrying a U.S. 11-3 and 12 Supply Points (now at Pearl Harbor) will assault Kwajalein (E:3301). The units will have completed their required preparation-time beginning with Game-Turn 1/12/43."

[10.11] The hex the Friendly units are to be debarked in must be within the Normal or Extended Range of land-based Friendly Air Points (any type both on the Game-Turn that the Mission is originally Plotted and the Game-turn that the Mission is actually carried out.

[10.12] Ground units preparing or available for an AMPH Mission may not engage in ground combat or land movement until the Game-Turn they perform the Amphibious Assault Mission: APB units preparing or available for AMPH Missions may not embark or debark units of any kind but may perform all other missions normally.

[10.13] Units preparing or available for an AMPH Mission may be withdrawn from the procedure at any time. Once withdrawn, they may again function as normal units of their type. However, if these units are again assigned to an AMPH Mission they must begin to perform the entire preparation procedure from the beginning.

[10.14] Units may be embarked or debarked onto an APB unit up to the limit of its Load Capacity. Units may be embarked or debarked at a cost (to the naval unit) of 5 Movement Points per Load Point. Four Supply Points are considered to be the equivalent of one Load Point for this purpose. The APB unit must spend the required Movement Points in the same hex as the embarking (or debarking) unit(s). Units being carried by amphibious units are placed under that unit on the Task Force Display.

[10.15] Amphibious Assaults are resolved in the same manner as Air Assaults. That is, Cases 6.93 through 6.98 also apply to Amphibious Assaults, with the exception that the assaulting units have their Attack Strength affected as follows during the Joint Assault Segment:

Unit | Attack Strength
Marine | Normal
Mechanized | Quartered (retain fractions)
All Other Ground Units | Halved (retain fractions)

From PW:

When a combat unit disembarks into a hex occupied by an enemy ground unit, the disembarking player must initiate combat (amphibious assaults) weather he is the Operation player or not. If the Advantage player conducts the assault, he must initial combat in the ensuing Ground Combat Phase of the next Battle Cycle (he can not Deactivate his assault units until the assault is resolved).

During this combat, the unit conducting the assault has its Troop Quality halved (round up) for the combat ratio determination only, unless a friendly ground unit already occupies the assault hex, or the assault hex is being simultaneously attacked by friendly ground units from another hex. If a unit performing amphibious assault sufferers a mandatory retreat result, and does retreat, it takes double the losses specified on the Combat Results Table, embarks, and immediately Deactivates. If the assaulted hex is not occupied by enemy ground units, the assaulting unit still can move no further. Any unit performing amphibious assault cannot purse.


All the Bold above are the clear violations of the rules by Bob Cross (aka Curtis Lemay, may the real Curtis RIP).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtis_LeMay

Neither game needed rules for invading a peacetime neutral.

[Curtis Lemay]

I was reading on Combined Fleet that three days prior to the Pearl attack on December 4th, weather conditions in the North Pacific were so bad that rough seas cause the Carrier Striking Force's destroyers to roll up to 45 degrees. Refueling scheduled for that day had to be cancelled.

Bad enough conditions for seasoned sailors. I could only imagine what it would have been like for infantrymen on those proposed destroyer transports. I bet the mops would have busy.

warspite1

Yes I raised this point and referenced the Germans heading for Narvik and Trondheim..... and that was only a few days at sea. There is also the very real problem of lack of exercise, keeping up fitness levels, diet etc. on the cramped, basic destroyer conversions in even moderately bad conditions..... This was a major problem exacerbated by the fact that the troops could have been at sea for months under the proposed plan.

But the answer was simply that such concerns can be disregarded. Reason?

It’s the Code of Bushido, and man’s a kamikaze, innit?

Operation Torch crossed the Atlantic. 18 days at sea.

All those soldiers have to do is stay in bed and smoke and drink and drink and smoke!

[Aurelian]

http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm

And Then There's the Really Gutsy Scenario...

At this point, having demonstrated the near-impossibility of the Japanese taking Hawaii after a triumph at Midway, the reader might well ask, "Well then, what if Japan had not only raided Pearl Harbor, but actually invaded it on December 7th, thereby not allowing the Americans to build up their defences, and catching them by complete surprise?" It's an interesting proposal.

It's also crazy. In fact, before proceeding to discuss the operation on its merits, let's all just acknowledge up front that the Imperial Army would never have authorized the committment of ground forces to Hawaii on Day One of the Pacific War. As it was, Yamamoto, through dint of his enormous personal prestige (and his rather shabby threats to resign unless he got his way) barely received permission to conduct a raid on Pearl Harbor. The apparent success of the attack has had the effect of dimming our recollection of how frought with peril the raid truly was. Attacking a major military bastion like Oahu, which bristled with land-based aircraft, and with the bulk of the American fleet present, was more than bold. That the Imperial Navy actually made the attack work, through dint of their superb operational planning, and plenty of just plain luck, should not be taken as an indication that the operation was somehow pre-ordained to succeed. Indeed, the Imperial Navy anticipated losing two carriers at Pearl Harbor, and knew that should their force be discovered before it could reach a launch point it might well be subjected to a crippling attack by both Hawaiian and carrier-based airpower. In the face of such opposition, the potential for a major disaster was very real.

Given these realities, the suggestion of sending a slow-moving invasion convoy into Hawaiian waters, even escorted by Kido Butai, would have been proof of insanity of an altogether different degree. Nagumo's Strike Force had the ability to dash into, and out of, air range of the Hawaiian islands at high speed, thereby limiting the Americans 'window of opportunity' to detect and attack it. This, in turn, increased the odds of achieving surprise, and decreased Kido Butai's exposure to counterattack. An invasion convoy would enjoy no such luxury. It would plod in at 10 to 12 knots, and then have to be prepared to sit offshore and take whatever beating the Americans could dish out for days, or even weeks, on end. The slower speed of the convoy would also greatly increase the odds that the Americans would get wind of what was underway before a Japanese attack could be launched. And then there was the issue of keeping Hawaii in supply should the attack succeed. In short, any officer who seriously suggested such an operation would most likely have been cashiered, and the odds of actually getting such an operation approved by Imperial GHQ was zero......

A couple of battalions seasick after a long voyage in a very cramped DDs just won't cut it. If you're not going to take Oahu, don't even bother with anything less.

[KingHart]

Can't train carrier pilots unless they're on carriers.

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

When the US carriers were in port their aircraft would transfer to an airfield (almost always Luke Field) in order to continue their training. The airfield would even have markers representing deck take-off points. Have you read anything like Lundstrom's "First Team" series?

My understanding was that of the 72 planes on Enterprise, only 24 were flown to Pearl on December 7, 1941. 11 were shot down. That leaves 48 on board.

Nevertheless, this site (Quora) answers a couple of questions about US carriers being in port or running into the Jap fleet:

https://www.quora.com/If-3-US-aircraft- ... ese-attack

Quora

If 3 US aircraft carriers were at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, could they have fought off the Japanese attack?

Henry Sirotin
Adjunct Professor Author has 218 answers and 60.4K answer views

“No. The Japanese would have had superiority in numbers, better fighters and torpedo bombers, and highly proficient aircrew (their standards were higher than ours) with several years of combat experience in China. They were prepared for war- at this point, we weren’t. We simply didn’t have the mindset yet. It took Pearl Harbor and several months of real war training to produce that.”

Tim Mahoney
Former USAF Industrial Security Program Manager (1989–1993) Author has 1.6K answers and 587.3K answer views

“If you're thinking that the Navy aircraft from those carriers would have made a difference in the outcome of the Pearl Harbor attack, you're grasping at straws and ignoring the hard military realities of that moment in history. First, if the Navy aircraft were safely on land bases, it's highly likely that they would have been caught on the ground and destroyed the way the Army aircraft had been. If you want to pretend that some Navy fighters might have gotten airborne and been difference makers, feel free…but you're mistaken. The principal US fighters that MIGHT have been available at Pearl Harbor were the Army P-40 and the Navy F4F Wildcat. Both visibly inferior to the Zero and would have had grossly inexperienced U S pilots confronting veteran, combat trained Japanese pilots, even if they had been airborne in anything close to large numbers…which they weren't.

The air groups would be at ford island, hit by 54 dive bombers then strafed by fighters during the first wave; then by 20 or so level bombers then strafed by fighters during the second wave. enterprise had F4F, Lex had F2A; don’t know when Saratoga replaced F2A with F4F, but had F4F on 7 Dec 41. They probably would have as much effect as those at wake, midway, i.e., not much.

You also have to remember that this was a Sunday and it was a surprise attack. Even though the planes are fueled, they do not have ordnance. You do not park the planes at the airfields loaded with weapons. ---That is just too dangerous.

All the ordnance is over in the Weapons Department magazines. So, while the airfield is being bombed, are you suggesting they should have driven over there and grabbed a bunch of ammo? The airstrike was all-but over in only a short time. It did not take the Japanese very long to fly over and expend their bombs. And, after you expend your ordnance, you do not hang around to have a look; people are going to be shooting at you. In spite of what you see in the movies, the whole show lasted less than 15 minutes, and they were headed back to the carriers. It takes MUCH longer than that to round up a crew on a Sunday morning, drive out to the mag area and get the available weapons, drive back, and prep the planes. And don't forget, the whole island is now in pure chaos. The whole harbor is in flames, and someone is begging for the keys to the weapons magazines out at the airfield. imagine you are the person in charge of guarding those magazines and a herd of half-nuts people wanted to get in. Do you give them the keys, or shoot them? Remember, this was NOT a 'normal' day at all.”

Related
If the American aircraft carriers had been able to attack the Japanese battlegroup off Pearl Harbor, how much would it have shortened the war?

John Collins
PhD in Chemistry, Princeton University Author has 5.8K answers and 9.3M answer views

“It is unlikely that the US carriers would have prevailed. IJN crews were experienced after battles against the Chinese in Southeast Asia. No USN aircraft could outfight a Zero. Japanese torpedoes worked reliably and at long range. USN naval tactics were evolving. Even months later at Guadalcanal, US carriers operated too far apart to give mutual assistance. In all likelihood, both US carriers available near Pearl Harbor would have been lost. If they got lucky, they might have taken out one or two IJN carriers but were outnumbered, out-trained, out-experienced and fighting with inferior weapons and tactics. The fortunes of war do not always play out as expected, but IJN is likely to have delivered a powerful blow to USN forces.”

I especially like the notion that “the whole island was in pure chaos”. Doesn’t sound like they’re going to be making the right moves for a while – as I’ve been saying.

Their planes are going to be caught on the ground without ammo and decimated. Any that get airborne will be inferior both in planes and pilots. Note that the Lexington had F2As – not even F4Fs yet. Probably even what F4Fs were available were still unfamiliar to their pilots.

This meshes well with my long contention that the US was clueless and unprepared for war. The whole theme of this is a scathing view of US readiness.

Unfortunately for your "US is clueless " thesis, everything your Quora "experts " have written is wrong:
The vast majority of the Japanese pilots at Pearl Harbor had no combat experience - most of the Japanese pilots in China were Army, not Navy ;
US pre-war pilot training was at least equal, if not superior, to Japanese pilot training;
Neither the P-40 nor the F4F were at all "visibly inferior " to the Zero, nor were US training and tactics inferior to Japanese standards;
The US had been preparing for war for over a year before Pearl Harbor, they didn’t just start on 7 December;
The total time of the raid was 90 minutes, not "less than 15 minutes";
A total of 14 US P-36 and P-40 fighters were able to get airborne during the second wave attack, the Japanese had 36 Zeroes, yet only shot down 2 US planes while the US pilots were credited with 11 kills.

Instead of relying on internet myths and 30-year-old PC game mechanics, might I suggest you read some of the more recent WW2 authors (Lundstom, Parshall, Zimm, etc).

[KingHart]

Again no starting details. Just admit you can't show how your plan could work in real life and we can stop asking these trivial questions.

Again, it's too trivial to waste time on details only the Japanese would need to figure out. They can figure out the optimum time to top off and stop to wait for the APDs to get far enough ahead.

Are you serious? Or have you just not read up on the actual process used by the Japanese in the lead up to the historic raid?

The historical plan didn't have an abort option. Radios and code words are all that are needed.

To put it as simply as possible - without any details you have no plan.
Details include:
Complete OOB (air, land, naval);
Chronology (when does the invasion force leave Japan / what route do they take/ how often and where do they refuel / when and where does KB stop to allow the APDs to get 12 hours ahead/ when does the APDs force start their run in to Maui / when does the landing take place/ where are the APDs after the landing/ when does the invasion force attack the airfield/ where is KB after the raid/ where is the Midway invasion force/ when is Midway invaded)
Options ( what to do if the Japanese are detected)
Follow-up ( how are the invasion forces supplied/supported)

Again, without answering any of the above questions with any details there is no way to determine whether or not your plan will succeed.

[warspite1]

To put it as simply as possible - without any details you have no plan.

warspite1

I think Curtis Lemay has answered this. These questions are trivial because the Japanese can work it out. The problem Curtis Lemay’s plan has is that when he does try and add some detail in, he provides contradictory comments. For example I notice that the point I made about the contradiction over abort times has simply been ignored. As said, this plan needs to be sold with the following: unless absolutely everything goes right, and on time, then the 40 precious Bettys and the almost 300 even more precious aircrew are on a suicide mission. Who is going to sign up for that?

There is just so much that is ignored here or glossed over. For example in answer to the comment about how 2,000 Japanese soldiers and their equipment are to remain hidden for 24 hours in the event of an abort, Curtis Lemay simply says there is plenty of jungle on Maui. Well that’s great..... but also totally meaningless without knowing where that ‘jungle’ is in relation to the beach....But there is no detail on that.

The timing of the invasion is set by the carriers and it being a Sunday. The weather, the tidal conditions etc. at the Maui invasion beach is therefore what it is (not that we know anything about the invasion beach and how remote it is, how suitable is it to take landing craft etc). Now fortunately for the Japanese, poor weather may assist the run in to Maui....but...its not going to help with getting thousands of troops ashore from the destroyers.. in complete darkness....in a limited timeframe....and without any noise.

All it would take is one accident, an overturned landing craft (dead Japanese troops available for washing up the next day), a destroyer colision or whatever, to ruin everything. But apparently all these questions are trivial...

[warspite1]

We keep being told about this magical 5,000 tons being delivered to fuel and arm the Bettys and Zeros. Again there is no detail provided on where these ships are going to dock, how the cargo is to be delivered to the airfield and what timeframe. There is no acknowledgement that it is now day time, there are US vessels at laihana Roads and (based on 7 December records) there will almost certainly be a US submarine or destroyer or two in the vicinity (this is of course uncertain but in deciding on whether to give this plan the green light, the Japanese would be aware of that).

So these Japanese troops have to quickly secure the airfield, secure a port (wherever that is and that can take the destroyers), suppress the defenders. All this with no transport and only light weaponry. And if all this goes without a hitch....

There is no acknowledgement that for many, many hours, the surviving Bettys will be sat vulnerable on the airstrip with no fuel, no meaningful AA, and no fighter cover, and hoping not to get attacked by any aircraft that Oahu can get in the air.... the surviving carrier planes for example...

[Buckrock]

Can't train carrier pilots unless they're on carriers.

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

When the US carriers were in port their aircraft would transfer to an airfield (almost always Luke Field) in order to continue their training. The airfield would even have markers representing deck take-off points. Have you read anything like Lundstrom's "First Team" series?

My understanding was that of the 72 planes on Enterprise, only 24 were flown to Pearl on December 7, 1941. 11 were shot down. That leaves 48 on board.

Sorry, what has this got to do with the scenario being discussed?
Peacetime SOP was that all flyable aircraft from a CV would be expected to be landed ashore if the carrier was going to moor in harbor. And I should point out the Enterprise never entered PH on Dec 7th so the fact that it may have still had aircraft on board on that day is irrelevant.

Nevertheless, this site (Quora) answers a couple of questions about US carriers being in port or running into the Jap fleet:

The quora information has no references. It appears to be opinion of no relevant qualification and some of it is clearly factually wrong.

I especially like the notion that “the whole island was in pure chaos”.

Good for you.

Doesn’t sound like they’re going to be making the right moves for a while – as I’ve been saying.

OK, so one unqualified opinion without references is backing up your own. Again, good for you but why is this supposed to convince me?

Their planes are going to be caught on the ground without ammo and decimated.

Maybe, maybe not. As previously stated, Luke Field on Ford Island did not suffer heavy damage on Dec 7th. It was considered still "open for business" immediately after the first wave (and the second). The historic attacks against the airfield were too small to have "decimated" the CAG groups had they been based there on Dec 7th. You would need to seriously change up the strike wave mix and objectives if you really want to seriously smack the CAGs. Get back to me if you ever get around to detailing the new KB strike schedule as I'm very interested in how all your objectives can be met.

Any that get airborne will be inferior both in planes and pilots.

As good as they were, the IJN CAG pilots and aircrew in their aircraft never demonstrated any clear superiority over their USN equivalents.

Note that the Lexington had F2As – not even F4Fs yet.

True dat.

Probably even what F4Fs were available were still unfamiliar to their pilots.

Wishful thinking. The Enterprise's fighter squadron had been using Wildcats since May '41 while the Saratoga's fighter squadron had done so since August, and that was long enough to develop the Thatch Weave.

This meshes well with my long contention that the US was clueless and unprepared for war. The whole theme of this is a scathing view of US readiness.

Whatever you think of the US historical performance, you are yet to show how it could render them so utterly helpless that the Japanese in your scenario could effectively do what they wished without consequence.

[Buckrock]

And if two battalions of Japanese troops had just landed on Maui when the mission abort was sounded then they can simply "remain in hiding" for 24 hours on a populated US island territory until the APDs return to pick them up and carry them off to safety.

warspite1

I wondered what you meant by that and then I re-read Curtis Lemay’s response to KingHart. To be clear, it is being proposed that 2,000 men, landed on Maui in the evening of 6 December 1941, could remain in hiding there (if the raid had to be cancelled) and then picked up in secret in the evening of the 7 December 1941. No one at any point detects 12 destroyer sized vessels sailing around Maui at will. No one spots 2,000 enemy troops and their equipment just inland from a beach for 24 hours....

Maui is 727 square miles in area. Lots of Jungle.

And the "Jungle" was nowhere close to Puunene airfield. Let us know when you have the details as to roughly where the Japanese are going to land, how far and through what areas you believe they would move after landing, then how far from Puunene do you expect them to go into hiding and finally, what is their plan to then capture the airfield if they hear the "go" order.

[Buckrock]

Again no starting details. Just admit you can't show how your plan could work in real life and we can stop asking these trivial questions.

Again, it's too trivial to waste time on details only the Japanese would need to figure out. They can figure out the optimum time to top off and stop to wait for the APDs to get far enough ahead.

Sorry but now you're just doubling down on vague.

Are you serious? Or have you just not read up on the actual process used by the Japanese in the lead up to the historic raid?

The historical plan didn't have an abort option.

It did.

Radios and code words are all that are needed.

Radios used from where? Maui? Oahu? Who tells Tokyo to spread the word that the mission is aborted?

[warspite1]

I was reading on Combined Fleet that three days prior to the Pearl attack on December 4th, weather conditions in the North Pacific were so bad that rough seas cause the Carrier Striking Force's destroyers to roll up to 45 degrees. Refueling scheduled for that day had to be cancelled.

Bad enough conditions for seasoned sailors. I could only imagine what it would have been like for infantrymen on those proposed destroyer transports. I bet the mops would have busy.

warspite1

Yes I raised this point and referenced the Germans heading for Narvik and Trondheim..... and that was only a few days at sea. There is also the very real problem of lack of exercise, keeping up fitness levels, diet etc. on the cramped, basic destroyer conversions in even moderately bad conditions..... This was a major problem exacerbated by the fact that the troops could have been at sea for months under the proposed plan.

warspite1

In response to this Curtis Lemay pointed out that:

Operation Torch crossed the Atlantic. 18 days at sea.

All those soldiers have to do is stay in bed and smoke and drink and drink and smoke!

In response to the first comment I would ask him to look at the size of vessels the American troops crossed the Atlantic in, and then compare to the Japanese destroyer conversions he proposes to use on the raid. They simply don't compare in size - and I strongly suspect - in creature comforts.

With regards the second point, this is rather disappointing. Under the plan, these Japanese troops could have been on the cramped, destroyer conversions for months. Even with the circa three week time frame here, troops would have needed to exercise and maintain fitness and alertness. After all, at the end of all this, they were going to have to take an island in a matter of a couple of hours.....

And as for the comment about the Zeros. Yes they lost nine, but more were damaged - some beyond repair. In this scenario, they would possibly have lost more given the extra aircraft on Oahu.

But even having circa 90 left for Midway is not the IJN's problem. Curtis Lemay's plan has effectively taken two front line carriers out of action. There is still new Midway, Wake, Darwin, the Indian Ocean Raid to come... or not. This plan is blunting the IJN's key weapon more than in real life.

The US can take additional losses. The Japanese can't. It really is that simple. Even at the time of real Midway, the 1st Air Fleet were hugely down on aircraft. Yes I believe they were still operating full strength squadrons, but there were no (or very few) spare aircraft. This plan is simply making the Japanese situation worse when compared to real life.

This is massive risk for negligible reward.

As a result of this plan, the Japanese have compromised the conquest of the NEI and given themselves a headache in the Eastern Pacific. Both will need more Japanese effort; the NEI because you’ve given the US in the PI more chance to intervene - and any delay is a problem. In doing this you have also weakened the Japanese forces in the PI available to counter.

In the Eastern Pacific, supplying, reinforcing and defending the aircraft you plonked on Maui will be pretty much impossible and will take a major fleet effort.

Delaying the US response by two years? You’ve just shortened the war and the final date for victory for the Allies.

[Torplexed]

There is just so much that is ignored here or glossed over. For example in answer to the comment about how 2,000 Japanese soldiers and their equipment are to remain hidden for 24 hours in the event of an abort, Curtis Lemay simply says there is plenty of jungle on Maui. Well that’s great..... but also totally meaningless without knowing where that ‘jungle’ is in relation to the beach....But there is no detail on that.

Will the naval aviation ground personnel be hiding out in the jungle too? Lugging along spare Type 91 aerial torpedoes, 250-kilogram bombs, crates of ammo and drums of fuel? Not mention all their tools, fuel pumps, generators, spare aircraft parts and equipment. I'm sure no one will notice all the drag marks and footsteps on the beach.

Gee, why didn't the Germans do Operation Sealion this way? Just sneak a few Sturmtruppen across the Channel every night in dribs and drabs. I'm sure there are some woods and thickets in Essex and Kent they could have hunkered down in until they had the prerequisite strength to seize a port or airfield. Maybe take along some of that yummy Code of Bushido as well.

[warspite1]

There is just so much that is ignored here or glossed over. For example in answer to the comment about how 2,000 Japanese soldiers and their equipment are to remain hidden for 24 hours in the event of an abort, Curtis Lemay simply says there is plenty of jungle on Maui. Well that’s great..... but also totally meaningless without knowing where that ‘jungle’ is in relation to the beach....But there is no detail on that.

Will the naval aviation ground personnel be hiding out in the jungle too? Lugging along spare Type 91 aerial torpedoes, 250-kilogram bombs, crates of ammo and drums of fuel? Not mention all their tools, fuel pumps, generators, spare aircraft parts and equipment. I'm sure no one will notice all the drag marks and footsteps on the beach.

Gee, why didn't the Germans do Operation Sealion this way? Just sneak a few Sturmtruppen across the Channel every night in dribs and drabs. I'm sure there are some woods and thickets in Essex and Kent they could have hunkered down in until they had the prerequisite strength to seize a port or airfield. Maybe take along some of that yummy Code of Bushido as well.

warspite1

No they follow up a few hours later according to the last version I read...... in daylight..... assuming a port has been taken of course. I don’t know where the destroyers for this have come from but......