ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
ORIGINAL: Mogami
Hi, Why bother playing as Japan if you have to just follow the historic plan? The 17th and 18th Army drew their formations from the other Army's. (17th Army had among other formations the 2nd Div and 38th Div. Both drawn from Southern Area Army HQ's as well as the 35th Bde)
17th Army in fact was composed completly from units reassigned from other Army HQ
As for the USMC Lemur is wrong not to have the 2nd Mar Div at start.
In 1939 the USMC was 2 Bde (really Regt) one on East Coast and 1 on West Coast the USMC had approx 20k men at this time.
In Feb 1941 the 2 Bde organized as Divisions of 3 Inf Rgt 1 Arty Rgt and 1 Eng Rgt each
By Nov 1941 the USMC had 65k men.
Both units should begin long war scenarios at around 33-50 percent TOE. Because USMC sqds are limited the player can only build 1 div at a time however both should be on map in case Japanese player gets frisky the 2nd Mar Div did exist. (The unit can train as it builds)
I think his point has more to do with historical REALITIES and LOGISTICAL limitations than simply following Japanese strategy and strategic timetables. The thing is, WITP has not really dealt well with the logistic aspects of the game. The idea is there, but thats about it.
-ships repair at unreal speeds
-refit model does not actually require yard time, when in real life, these required many weeks and months
-ports have no operations limits or maximum capacity
-no distinction between a naval base and a fishing wharf for supply purposes
-no real political requirements or force minimums for most part aside from a near endless supply of PPs and Kwantung/China (IE. one can strip Bombay of troops in the face of Japanese threat)
-weather does not have much impact on anything...Monsoons in Burma theatre were had strategic implications but seasons don't even affect movement.
We can go on and on but the implications of these limitations are many. The most obvious is the unrealistic pace with which operations can and will be undertaken by player. It still amazes me that these issues remain unaddressed from one incarnation to the next.
Yes, its like it is there in enough quantity to let us know the designers recognized these were factors, but just barely. I understand a lot of things were done in the interest of game balance and game play, and the reason they probably went with HQ's functioning the way they function. Unfortunately it results in completely RIDICULOUS troop movements. There should be some kind of significant cost to reflect heavy burden of making such fundemental strategic decisions, especially in terms of reflectiong opportunity costs. Part of the reason the shipping version scenarios have bogus marine divsions and fantasy NZ units is to counter Japanese running wild in the south with units freed from very early conquests in the PI or Malaysia. Well the reason they can run wild in the first place are these unrealistic troop movement allowances!
Moving a 14th Army PI division to the 17th Army Solomon command or the 18th Army New Guinea command should cost roughly 1000 PP at the VERY LEAST! Not to mention the extreme cost that should be incurred to allow IJA forces to take over IJN offensive operations in the Solomons. That's something that had to be approved all the way back in Tokyo with Tojo and Yamamoto himself, hell probably even the Emperor!
This is big reason why this model would fail and fail miserably if used to create a new War In Russia. There is no real command structure in the game to speak of.
					
					
 


